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NURSING HOME LIABILITY FOR FAILURE OF
CARE UNDER THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS
ACT
The False Claims Act ("FCA") has been used to increasing
accountability amongst the many entities that bill the Federal Government
for services.' As government spending has increased, it has become
essential to control government expenditures and prevent unscrupulous
contractors from taking advantage of easily accessible taxpayer dollars.2
The growth in healthcare spending in recent decades has demonstrated the
need for the federal government to have these powerful tools to combat
fraud of its programs.3 However, the FCA has not gone far enough in its
protection of federal funds spent on nursing homes, primarily through the
Medicaid program. 4 As decisions in recent years show, there is
disagreement among the various circuits about what constitutes a false
claim made to the government.5 The circuits have differed on the criteria
to establish falsity under the statute.6 In United States ex rel. Escobar v.
Universal Health Services, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
unify the law nationally and finally granted the broad protections to federal
funds initially intended by the creators of the statute.8 A following of the
First Circuit's reasoning will correctly interpret the statute as its creators
intended and protect federal funds in all programs, including health care
and nursing homes, into the next century. 9
Throughout the Civil War, immense amounts of government funds
were flying out of federal coffers to fund the Union Army, and contractors
were lining up to provide anything from "mules to rifles."' 0 Many of these
contractors supplied sub-standard goods, and were more than willing to

1 See infra Part I (detailing history and creation of FCA).
See infra Part I (describing history of FCA and increase in government spending).
3 See infra note 13 (describing need for additional protections).
4 See infra Part 0 (arguing need for additional protections for government funds spent on
nursing home care).
5 See infra Parts II and IV (outlining circuit split over definition of false claim).
6 See infra Parts III, IV (discussing variety of interpretations of
falsity).
7 780 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2015).
8 See infra Parts I, V (explaining holding in Escobar).
9 See infra Part V (discussing First Circuit interpretation).
2

10 See David L. Haron, Mercedes Varasteh Dordeski & Larry D. Labman, Bad Aules: A
Primer on the FederalandMichigan False Claims Acts, 88 MICH. B.J. 22, 22 (2009) (discussing

origins of Federal False Claims Act).
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profit at the government's expense." Thus, by the conclusion of the war,
Abraham Lincoln and the rest of the Federal Government were eager to
enact legislation that would protect government expenditures; legislation
that eventually became the FCA. 12
Today, federal spending on healthcare, via the Medicare, Medicaid,
and Children's Health Insurance (CHIP) programs has become a significant
portion of federal dollars paid out to contractors.' 3 Spending on these
programs has consistently grown over the last several decades and it was
estimated that in fiscal year 2015, the programs would comprise over
27.7% of all federal spending. 14 This trend is projected to continue over
the next several decades, particularly given the country's aging
population. 15 Coinciding with this increased spending will be an increased
demand from the aging population for long-term services and support,
particularly spending on nursing facilities. 16 Of course, these changing
economics will also affect healthcare spending by state governments in
their individual Medicaid programs. 17 Given these growing areas of
spending, many state and local officials have increased their use of the
FCA and parallel state statutes to act as a check on unscrupulous

contractors. 18

However, bringing these cases against long-term care

11 See id. at 23 (describing frauds which occurred during Civil War).
12
13

See id. (articulating purpose of Federal False Claims Act).
See FederalBudget Tipsheet: Health Care Spending, NAT'L PRIORITIES PROJECT 1, 1, 24,

2017) https://media.nationalpriorities.org/uploads/health_6.5.2015.pdf (last visited on Mar. 24,
2017) (describing federal spending on healthcare).
14 See id at 1 (demonstrating overall growth in federal healthcare spending and 2015
projections).
15 See The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook, CONG. BUDGET OFF., 21 (June 2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/1 14th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50250LongTermBudgetOutlook-4.pdf (outlining growth in future spending).
According to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in recent years, spending on mandatory programs, such as
the healthcare programs and Social Security, has comprised 60 percent of noninterest spending.
Id. Further, most of the growth in noninterest spending is attributable to the healthcare programs,
including additional federal spending created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Id. The CBO
estimated that under current laws, spending on the mandatory programs would outpace overall
economic growth and increase from 5.2 to 8.0 percent of gross domestic product by 2040. Id.
The increase will be primarily attributable to three major causes: the aging of the population,
rising health care spending per beneficiary, and an increased number of recipients of exchange
subsidies and Medicaid benefits attributable to the ACA. Id.
16 See Rising Demand for Long-Term Services and Supports for Elderly People, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE (June 2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/reports/44363-LTC.pdf (suggesting that spending will continue to rise if programs are not
changed).
17 See id. (outlining increased pressure on state budgets due to aging).
18 See Haron et al., supra note 10, at 24 (noting increased use of FCA in prosecuting
healthcare providers).
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facilities has presented a challenge in the past, and will continue to do so
going forward. 19
I.

THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT

A key aspect of the FCA is the ability for individuals to bring suit
on behalf of the federal government, which is known as a qui tam.2 0 The
concept of a qui tam dates back to the year 695 in England and, generally,
is short for "he who prosecutes for himself as well as for the king.", 2 1 This
provision in the FCA has allowed the government access to cases that
would not otherwise be brought, for the government would have no
knowledge of the activity and, without the incentive of the qui tam action,
the whistleblower would have no reason to bring it forward.22 Qui tam
actions came to the United States under the FCA following the Civil War
as the government was trying to combat fraud perpetrated by contractors. 23
The earliest targets of the FCA had provided defective products during the
24
war, causing the government to lose valuable time and money.
In certain
25
cases, the goods were not the actual product to be procured.
The FCA prohibits any knowing demand for payment to which a
defendant in the action is not entitled but makes no direct mention of an
express certification of compliance. 26 An FCA claim is only successful
when all elements are proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 27 Since
its creation, the courts have interpreted the reach of the FCA to be broad,
covering all types of fraud that may result in a loss to the government. 28 In
order to be found guilty of an FCA violation, the following must be met: an
19 See infra Part 0.
20 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(C) (2016) (West 2010) (describing qui tam action).
21 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (citing III
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 160 (1768) (transliteration supplied)

(discussing origins of qui tam actions).
22 See Cleveland Lawrence III, False ClaimsAct and Qui Tam QuarterlyReview, 77 FALSE
CL. ACT AND Qui TAM Q. REv. NL 1, 1 (2015). ("Without doubt, False Claims Act cases both
those filed by relators and those filed by the federal government are on the rise, leading to more
court opinions, settlements and judgments."). The FCA touches nearly every industry and
government program and enables a wide range of individuals to be whistleblowers, growing the
significance of the FCA. Id.
23

See Haron et al., supra note 10, at 22 (reviewing origins of FCA).

See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607,
609 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating brief history of qui tam actions).
25 See id. (describing type of fraud which occurred during Civil War).
26 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2009) (listing elements for liability under FCA).
27 See 31 U.S.C.A. § 373 1(d) (West 2009) (stating elements needed to bring action).
28 See Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003) (describing
breadth of FCA).
24
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entity must present or cause to be presented a claim for payment or
approval; the claim must be false or fraudulent; and the person's act must

be undertaken knowingly, either with actual knowledge of the information
or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth or the falsity
of the claim. 29 Historically, "a false statement within a claim can only
make the entire claim fraudulent if the statement is material to the request
or demand for money."30 In addition to the courts' interpretation of the
FCA, Congress has been clear that the intention was for the law to be
broad, and they have continued to move to expand the scope of the Act.3 '

As state governments recognize similar issues with contractors and
growing state spending, many enacted laws which mimicked the scope of

the FCA.3 2 Often times these state laws are so close in language to the
FCA that interpretations on scope and intent under the FCA are used by

state level courts in interpreting the state statutes.33
II. WORTHLESS SERVICES UNDER MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
Medicare and Medicaid are essentially health insurance programs
for the elderly and low-income or otherwise qualified individuals
respectively. 34 Under the Medicaid regulations, a nursing facility provides
non-compliant or deficient care when the care does not meet a participation
requirement as specified in the relevant statutes or regulations.35 In order
for services to be considered worthless, they must be so deficient that for
all practical purposes they are the equivalent of no performance of services
at all. 36 Worthless services cases are often pursued civilly under the FCA,
29

See United States. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir.

2007) (stating requirements needed to be found guilty under U.S.C. § 3729).
30 United States ex rel. Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Grp., 400 F.3d 428, 443 (6th
Cir. 2005), superseded by statute Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11121, 123 Stat. 1617, as recognized in U.S. ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy
Dist., 842 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating claim mustbe false orfraudulent).
31 See FALSE CLAIMS ACT CORRECTION ACT OF 2009, H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 2 (2009)
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/11 lth-congress/house-report/97/1 (referring FCA
modifications from Committee on Judiciary to House of Representatives).
32

See James F. Barger, Jr. et. al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of

Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REv. 465, 478 (2005) (presenting empirical
analysis of effects of FCA). As of 2005, nineteen states had some type of false claims act
provision, while thirteen of those had provisions for qui tam relators. Id. "[T]he success of the
federal FCA has motivated a growing minority of state legislators to pass similar statutes." Id.
33 See id. at 485-88 (detailing similarities between FCA and state false claims statutes).
31 See 42 C.F.R. § 488 (2017) (defining Medicare and Medicaid).
31 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2017) (defining participation requirements).
36 See United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing
fraudulent services under FCA). In the Straus case, a physician brought suit against her partners
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however, actions can be so egregious that criminal action is warranted.
The FCA also allows for certain services to be considered worthless if they

were billed as the result of other illegal practices, even if the services
themselves had value.3 8 Outside of these other factors, establishing that a
service is worthless is a difficult standard to meet as services that are worth
at least something, but not full price, are not worthless.39 To determine
whether the services are worthless, courts use a fact-specific analysis on

each case. 40
The essential concern is whether the government would have paid
for the claim had it known all the facts surrounding it. 4 ' Worthless services
as a theory of a false claim is distinct from falsity under the FCA generally,

however worthless services can still be evidence under the general falsity
theory.42
At some very blurry point, a provider of care can cease to
maintain this standard by failing to perform the minimum
necessary care activities required to promote the patient's
quality of life. When the provider reaches that point, and

under the FCA alleging they submitted false Medicare claims and conspired to defraud the
government. Id. at 693. The practice had allegedly been using spirometry equipment, essentially
tools that were out of calibration that test lung function particularly related to conditions of
asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary fibrosis. Id. at 693-94. The equipment was allegedly so
poorly maintained that it was out of any practically applicable calibration, thus any claims made
to the Medicare program while using this equipment were false due to their unreliability. Id. at
694-95. The Second Circuit went on to review the "legally false" certification theory. Id. at 69698.
37 See United States v. Wachter, No. 4:05CR667SNL, 2006 WL 2460790, at *11 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 23, 2006) (holding certain tests billed to government as worthless). Courts have also found
that, although some services were provided, if they have no value, they can be considered
worthless to the government under the FCA. Id.; see also United States v. Smithkline Beecham
Clinical Labs, 245 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating plaintiff's argument that defendant's
tests were worthless, false and, thus, violated FCA).
38 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West 1965). This provision, known as the Stark law, prohibits
doctors from sending patients to companies in which they have an ownership interest, often
laboratories for testing, services rendered as those co-owned businesses are considered worthless
since the entire claim is tainted by the relationship. Id. at § 1395nn(i)(1)(C)(iii).
39 See United States ex rel Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699,
710 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing what constitutes "worthless" under FCA).
40 See United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., No. 3:11 43 DCR, 2011 WL 6337455,
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011) (stating worthless claims are fact-specific determinations).
41 See James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand: The False Claims
Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care - A Legal and Economic Perspective, 10 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 113, 156 (2007) (supporting necessity for specific facts). "Proof in a worthless
services claim should go to the very essence of the basis for which payment was made,
supporting the argument that the government would not pay if it had known." Id.
42 See Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[A] claim can
be false or fraudulent if the speaker offers a misleading half-truth.").
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still presents claims for reimbursement to Medicare, the
provider has simply committed fraud against the United
4
States. 1

The worthless services standard, particularly in nursing home

cases, is a difficult one to meet as the services must be shown to be of
completely zero value. 44 There must also be specificity as to the extent of
the issue in the claim.45 Inherent in nursing home cases are difficulties that
result from the billing of services on a per diem basis. 46 "Even where
services are provided per diem, reasonable persons would know that
supplying limited, or no, basic services would fail to comport with the very
essence of the provider and benefit agreements, and that seeking
reimbursement for such deficient services would constitute fraud."47
III. FALSITY UNDER THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT

In order to be considered false under the FCA, the false element of
the claim must be material to determine whether the government would
have made the payment. 48 For the element of knowingly, the courts have
developed the terms "implied" or "express" certification of a claim, in
order to differentiate how certain behaviors can give rise to the false

claim.

49

Express is documenting that a claim specifically meets the

requirements for payment, while implied certification continues to do
certain actions that are not in compliance generally, without specifically
certifying that the provider is in compliance with those regulations.50
Courts have also used distinctions between aspects of the claim that are

43 United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (W.D. Mo. 2001)

(discussing providers' duty of care to patients).
44 See Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., 764 F.3d at 709 (quoting United States ex rel. Mikes

v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001)) ("The performance of the service [must be] so
deficient that for all practical purposes it is equivalent of no performance at all.").
45 See id.at 714 (expressing plaintiff s burden of proof).
46 See NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (discussing fraud in provision of
services that are billed per diem).
47 United States v. Houser, No. 4:10 CR 012 HLM, 2011 WL 2118847, at *10 (N.D. Ga.
May 23, 2011) (stating how, under objective standard, fraud was obvious under facts of case).
48 See United States ex rel Loughren v. Unum Grp., 613 F.3d 300, 307 (1st Cir. 2010)
(discussing materiality as element of common law fraud); United States v. Rogan- 517 F.3d 449,
452 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing importance of material element for FCA claims).
49 See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med. Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir.
2011) (explaining distinction between implied and express certification to prove false claims act
violation).
50 See id. at 382-83 (reiterating difference between implied and expressed certification).

2017]

NURSING HOME LIABILITY FOR FAILURE OF CARE

335

factually and legally false. 5 ' Under an implied certification theory, a
violation of a continuing duty to comply with a regulation on which a
payment is conditioned is considered one method of establishing falsity
under the FCA.52 This is based on the idea that "the act of submitting a
claim for reimbursement itself implies" that the entity is complying with
the applicable "rules that are a precondition to payment" for the claim.53
IV. PREVIOUS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CONDITIONS OF
PARTICIPATION AND CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT
Like implied and express certifications, the terms "conditions of
participation" and "conditions of payment" are concepts created by the
courts that establish falsity under the Act but are outside the language of
the FCA.54 For skilled nursing facilities (SNF), conditions of participation

are the requirements that an institution needs to meet in order to participate
in the Medicare program as a SNF or in the Medicaid program as a nursing

facility.55 Conditions of participation are not prerequisites for payment of a
claim but are instead quality of care standards directed towards the
providers' continued ability to participate in the program.56 While all

51

See United States ex rel Conner v. Salina Reg'l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th

Cir. 2008) (recognizing two types of actionable claims). In Conner, an ophthalmologist brought a
qui tam action on behalf of the United States against Salina Regional Health Center. Id. at 1214.
Conner alleged that Salina engaged in a variety of violations of Medicare regulations and statutes.
Id. Primarily however, the allegations stemmed from the improper submission of annual cost
reports. Id. Conner alleged that in reliance on these cost reports, they were certified by the
company as compliant with the Medicare laws and regulations; thus Salina obtained unfair
payment in violation of the FCA. Id.
52 See United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Sews., 289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., 136 F. Supp.2d 876, 894
(M.D. Tenn. 2000)) ("Defendants acted knowingly for purposes of the FCA when they submitted
the 1993 and 1994 cost reports to Medicare seeking reimbursement for ESOP expenses ....
").
53 See United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining
implied false certification claim).
54 See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 511 (1st
Cir. 2015) (indicating required elements of falsity).
55 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 (2016) (establishing requirements for nursing homes participating in
Medicare).
56 See United States ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d
972, 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (clarifying "[c]onditions of Participation are not the equivalent of
conditions of payment"). In Landers, a registered nurse brought an action regarding a violation
of the FCA. Id. at 974-75. Specifically, Landers alleged the corporation maintained improper
staffing ratios in the intensive care unit leading to care that violated regulations. Id. She
additionally alleged that "scrub technicians" were used in certain instances where nurses were
required, thus resulting in a failure to meet the standard of care for sterilization or cleanliness. Id.
The court ultimately found that the "[p]laintiff ha[d] failed to present sufficient evidence that
[d]efendants' alleged violations of applicable standards of care were 'so deficient that for all

336

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXII

courts consider conditions of payment to be terms under which the FCA
false claim can be established, there are varying interpretations as to
whether conditions of participation can be used to establish falsity.5 7 In
fact, the circuits remain split on this issue, as the Third, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have adopted a rule that in cases where an underlying
regulation expressly prohibits payment upon non-compliance with its
terms, the submission of a claim implicitly certifies compliance with the
regulation.58 The First Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have, however, read
this more broadly by stating "a claim can be false or fraudulent due to an
implied representation of compliance with a precondition of payment that
is not expressly stated in a statute or regulation."5 9
The First Circuit has rejected many of these categorical distinctions
between "legally" and "factually" false as well as "express" and "implied"
certification, and has instead created a different standard for falsity. 60 The
Amgen case reiterated the importance of a fact-intensive and contextspecific inquiry of FCA claims. 6' The Amgen and Blackstone cases
simplified the structure of the analysis with the goal of returning to the
language contained in the FCA itself, as well as aligning the falsity analysis
with the broad intent to return money that the government spent on subpractical purposes it is the equivalent of no performance at all."' Id. at 980 (citing United States
ex rel Mikes v.Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001)).
57 Compare United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., CIV.A. 3:11-43-DCR, 2011
WL 6337455, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011) (stating most courts have adopted this principle),
with United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir.
2011) (noting differences among courts).
58 See United States ex rel Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 309 (3d Cir.
2011) (describing conditions of payment); Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)
(drawing distinction between expressed and implied certification); United States ex rel Conner v.
Salina Reg'l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding court must look at
underlying statutes to determine whether certification was condition of payment). In Wilkins,
former employees took action as relators in a qui tam case claiming that United Health violated
several marketing rules related to its business with CMS, Medicare, and Medicaid. Wilkins, 659
F.3d at 300.
59 Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 387; see also United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626
F.3d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2010). These cases argue the requirement that the regulation be
"expressly written" in a regulation or statute are not written into the FCA and have been
artificially adopted by the courts which is outside the intent of the statute, and which was meant
to be broad. See Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1269-70; Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 386.
As of 2011, the Sixth Circuit had not addressed this issue. See VillaspringHealth Care Cfr., 2011
WL 6337455, at *7.
60 See New York v. Amgen, Inc., 652 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant's
categorical argument); Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 385-86 (asserting that use of terms does more to
obscure than clarify); Lonie Kim, Note, Am I Liable? The Problem ofDefining Falsity Under the
False Claims Act, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 160, 161-62 (2013) (discussing different definitions of
falsity).
61 See Amgen, 652 F.3d at 111 (recognizing importance of fact-intensive and content-specific
inquiry).
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standard services. 62
The Blackstone case went further to say that
preconditions of payment can be found not only in statutes and regulations,
but also in contracts with providers, and that the preconditions of payment
need not be expressly stated.63
V. AFFIRMATION IMPLIED CERTIFICATION AND A NEW TEST
FOR MATERIALITY UNDER ESCOBAR
Recently, the First Circuit in its decision in United States ex. rel.
Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc. ("Escobar T,) 64 recommitted to
their broadened understanding of falsity. 65 The lower court had incorrectly
held that only misrepresentations of compliance with conditions of
payment made a statement false under the FCA. 66 In Escobar I, the court
found that there was actually no distinction in the case of precondition of
participation and a condition of payment, because they were in fact, one in

the same. 67 This was in contrast to a decision in a Seventh Circuit case,
United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd 68 which would come to the opposite
conclusion that implied certification is not a doctrine to be followed. 69 The
decisions in these 2015 cases set out two divergent theories, which were
resolved by the Supreme Court in its 2016 decision in Escobar.

62

See Kim, supra note 60, at 176-77 (explaining how simplified analysis would be best in

FCA claims).
63 See Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 387-88 (stating preconditions of payment are not expressly
stated in FCA).
64 780 F.3d 504.
65 See id. at 512 (outlining various circuits' distinctions between factually and legally false
submissions).
66 See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., No. CIV. A. 11-11170DPW, 2014 WL 1271757, at *5-11 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (finding only misrepresentations of
compliance with conditions of payment made statement false under FCA). The court also
referenced cases from the Second and Sixth Circuits which found similarly that only conditions of
payment mattered for falsity, rather than conditions of participation. United States ex rel. Hobbs
v. Medquest Assocs., 711 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2013) (highlighting importance of both
conditions of participation and conditions of payment); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d
Cir. 2001) (finding participation and payment distinctions irrelevant).
67 See Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d at 513 (highlighting court's decision of finding no
distinction between conditions of participation and payment).
68 788 F.3d696, 696 (7th Cir. 2015).
69 See id. at 711-12 (joining Fifth Circuit); see also discussion infra Section V(B) (discussing
implied certification).
70 See infra Section V(B) (showing divergent theories); see also infra Section V(0)
(discussing impact of decision in Escobar and impact on government contractors).
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Escobar and the First Circuit's Acceptance of Jmplied
Certification.

In Escobar, the relators' daughter, Yarushka Rivera, a recipient of
benefits under the state's Medicaid program, was experiencing behavioral
problems and sought treatment. 7' The daughter eventually saw several
counselors at Arbour Counseling Services ("Arbour"), which was owned
and operated by the defendant, Universal Health Services (UHS). 7 2 The
initial counselor who saw Rivera had no professional license to provide
mental health therapy and, according to the relators, the counselor lacked
supervision. 7 ' Rivera was eventually transferred to the care of another staff
member who was unlicensed as well, and relators again had concerns
regarding proper supervision of the treatment.74 Eventually, Rivera was

assigned to a new therapist, who purported to be a psychologist with a
Ph.D. before diagnosing her with bipolar disorder. 75 Due to additional
attendance requirements from the school, Rivera again changed caretakers,
this time staff member named Maribel Ortiz, who Rivera believed was a
psychiatrist, however Ortiz was actually only a licensed nurse. 76 Ortiz
prescribed Rivera a medication for the bipolar disorder to which she had an

71

See Universal Health Services, 780 F.3d at 509 (detailing relevant facts). The daughter,

Yarushka Rivera, was a teenager and was experiencing difficulties at school. Id. The issues,
following unsuccessful treatment, eventually resulted in her prohibition from attending classes.
Id.
72 See id. at 508 (highlighting key facts). Arbour was a participant in the Massachusetts state
Medicaid program known as MassHealth. Id. Arbour regularly billed MassHealth for services
provided to individuals covered under the program. Id.
73 See id. at 509 (detailing counselor's qualifications). The relators met with the counselors,
supervisor Maria Pereyra and Clinical Director Edward Keohan following complaints from
Rivera that she was not benefiting from the treatment. Id. The relators became concerned that
Keohan was not properly supervising Pereyra because he was not familiar with Rivera's
treatment. Id.
74 See id. (delineating facts relevant to relators' claims against UHS). After
the initial
meeting with Keohan- Rivera was transferred to the care of another staff member. Id. The second
counselor, Diana Casado, also was supervised by Keohan and, like Pereyra, was not licensed to
treat Rivera. Id.
75 See id. at 508 (discussing Rivera's eventual diagnosis). The newly assigned therapist,
Anna Fuchu, had been trained at an unaccredited online school. Id. Additionally, her application
for a professional license from the state had been rejected. Id.
76 See Universal Health Services, 780 F.3d at 508 (explaining how Rivera's parents believed
Ortiz was doctor not nurse). Rivera's parents referred to Ortiz as "Dr. Ortiz." Id. In addition to
only being licensed as a nurse rather than a psychiatrist, Ortiz was not under the supervision of
staff at Arbour. Id. Furthermore, the individual who would have been supervising her was herself
not board-certified, nor was she eligible for board certification. Id.
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adverse reaction.77 Rivera on her own opted to discontinue the medication
but shortly thereafter suffered a seizure. 78 Rivera later resumed treatment
after her parents spoke with staff at Arbour.79 After continuing on care
under Ortiz at Arbour she suffered another seizure, this time fatally.80
Relators filed complaints with several state agencies.8 1 Relators
later filed a complaint in U.S. District Court against UHS under both the
federal and Massachusetts False Claims Act for the services billed to
MassHealth. 8 2 The complaint was however dismissed in its entirety as the
lower court held that only UHS's noncompliance with conditions of
payment, rather than conditions of participation, could establish the falsity

of the claim.83

Specifically, the district court stated that there was no

indication in the text of any of the regulations that they were intended to be
conditions of payment rather than conditions of participation.8 4 Relators
appealed that dismissal to the First Circuit Court.85

" See id.

See id. (explaining decision to discontinue medicine).
See id.(discussing why Rivera resumed her medication). Rivera's parents spoke to
Keohan who directed a staff psychologist to supervise Ortiz. Id.
80 See United States ex rel Escobar v. Universal Health Sews., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 508 (1st
78

79

Cir. 2015) (describing circumstances of Rivera's death). Shortly after the seizure, Rivera's
parents met with a social worker who had worked with Rivera. Id.at 510. The social worker
informed them that the counselors who had provided care were not licensed to provide treatment
without supervision, nor were they permitted to prescribe medication. Id.
81 See id. at 510 (describing where relators filed complaints). Complaints were filed with the
Disabled Person's Protection Commission ("DPPC"), Division of Professional Licensure
("DPL"), and the Department of Public Health ("DPH"). Id. These agencies varied in their
findings with DPPC, concluding that there was insufficient evidence of abuse of a disabled
person due to leaving the door open to staff members being out of compliance with relevant
requirements. Id DPH, however, found Arbour had violated fourteen distinct regulations
regarding staff supervision and licensure. Id.Notably DPH found that, "'23 therapists were not
licensed for independent practice and also ... were not licensed in their discipline."' Id. (citing
report by DPH attached to Respondent's brief).
82 See id.
83 See id.
(describing lower court's finding). The court relied on the preamble to chapter 429
of the MassHealth Regulations which "establishes requirements for participation of mental health
centers in MassHealth." 130 MAss.CODE REGS. 429.401 (2017). In full the regulation states:
130 CMR 429.000 establishes requirements for participation of mental health centers
in MassHealth and governs mental health centers operated by freestanding clinics,
satellite facilities of clinics, and identifiable units of clinics. All mental health centers
participating in MassHealth must comply with the MassHealth regulations, including
but not limited to MassHealth regulations set forth in 130 CMR 429.000 and 450.000.
Id.
84
85

See id.
(considering district court's reasoning).
See United States ex rel Escobar v. Universal Health Sew., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 511 (1st

Cir. 2015).
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In its decision on Escobar,the First Circuit considered the intent of
the FCA and acknowledged that it was intended to be expansive in nature,
intended "to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result
in financial loss to the government."8 6 The court went on to review the
definition of "falsity" under the FCA, noting that it is not found in the
statute, leaving circuit courts to interpret the definition themselves.8 7 The
court reviewed their ruling in Blackstone that determined that implied and
express certification created "artificial barriers" and Amgen which
established the need to comply with a precondition of payment.88 The
court further detailed that the key was to look at "a broad view of what may
constitute a false of fraudulent statement to avoid 'foreclos[ing] FCA
liability in situations that Congress intended to fall within the Act's
scope.
The circuit court recognized that the district court, in the
Escobar case, had relied on the term preconditions of payment because the
Amgen and Blackstone decisions had been framed on that manner. 90 The
circuit court went on to find issue with this analysis and clarify their
position stating that, "[W]hile the district court concluded that only claims
premised on misrepresentation of compliance with a condition of payment
are cognizable under the FCA, we find that any payment/participation

86 Id. at 512 (quoting Cook Cnty., Ill. v. U.S. ex rel Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003)).
The Cook Chty. case referenced by the First Circuit involved a qui tam action brought against a
county that operated a hospital for research on the treatment of drug-dependent pregnant women.

538 U.S. at 119. The Cook Cnty. Court relied on US. v. Neifert-White, Co. which concluded

that:
[T]he original False Claims Act was passed in 1863 as a result of investigations of the
fraudulent use of government funds during the Civil War. Debates at the time suggest
that the Act was intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might
result in financial loss to the Government.
United States v. Neifert-White, Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (citing Cong. Globe, 37th Cong.,
3d Sess. 952-58).
87 See Escobar, 780 F.3d at 512 (discussing generally FCA).

88 See id. (outlining recently established requirements for FCA compliance).
89 Id. (quoting United States ex rel Jones v. Brigham & Women's Hosp. 678 F.3d 72, 85 (1st
Cir. 2012)).
90 See United States v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 513 (1st Cir. 2015)
(discussing lower court's decision). "The [district] court reasoned that, because the holdings of
both decisions were framed in terms of conditions of payment, Hutcheson and the subsequent
case of Amgen at least implicitly accepted the "condition of payment/condition of participation
dichotomy." Id. (citing U.S. ex rel Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc., CIV.A. 11-11170DPW, 2014 WL 1271757, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014). The district court had relied
specifically on language from Amgen and Hutcheson that mentioned preconditions of payment
while omitting any mention of preconditions of participation. Id. The lower court also relied on

cases from the Second and Sixth Circuits, which had adopted the same framework. See id. at *6
n. 1.
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distinction is not relevant here. As in Amgen, the provisions at issue in this
case clearly impose conditions of payment." 91
The court laid out the MassHealth regulations that were applicable
to Arbour in the context of the case .92 The court acknowledged that the

fact that the supervision at Arbour, "was either grossly inadequate or
entirely lacking is the core of Relators' complaint. Insofar as Relators have
alleged noncompliance with regulations pertaining to supervision, they
have provided sufficient allegations of falsity to survive a motion to
dismiss." 93 The opinion concluded by saying that:
Compliance with the regulations at issue pertaining to staff
supervision and core staffing at satellite centers is a
condition of payment by MassHealth. Because our case
law makes clear that a healthcare provider's
noncompliance with conditions of payment is sufficient to
establish the falsity of a claim for reimbursement, we need
not address here whether the False Claims Act embraces a
distinction between conditions of payment and conditions
of participation. 94
91

Id.

92

See id (noting particular portion of MassHealth regulations). The regulations provide

that:
[S]ection 429.439 of the MassHealth regulations expressly provides that "[s]ervices
provided by a satellite program are reimbursable only if the program meets the
standards described below [in subsections (A) through (D)]." Subsection (A) pertains
to parent centers' supervision of satellite programs, while subsection (B) addresses the
supervision that must occur within autonomous satellites, which "must provide
supervision and in-service training to all noncore staff employed at the satellite
program." Subsection (C) further demands that all satellites employ a full-time clinical
director who meets the qualifications required of core staff members in his or her
discipline, as set forth in section 429.424; in addition, supervisors at dependent
satellites must "receive regular supervision and consultation from qualified core staff at
the parent center."
Id.(citations omitted).
93 Id. at 514.
This acknowledgement was followed by further analysis of whether the
Relators had pled sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss given the court's interpretation of the
FCA. Id.
at 514-17.
94 Id.at 517. The court continued:
[I]n the final analysis, Relators' daughter died after receiving treatment that was out of
compliance with over a dozen regulations, as determined by an independent report.
Relators have carefully compiled information regarding the names of unlicensed and
unsupervised providers, and the dates, amounts, and codes of allegedly false claims
submitted to MassHealth. As such, they have appropriately stated a claim with
particularity under the FCA.
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Essentially, the First Circuit incorporated the regulations governing
payment for providers under the MassHealth program as required for
providers to receive payment; thus non-compliance with this series of
regulations would lead to liability under the FCA. 95 As a result of these
findings by the court, the case was remanded for proceedings consistent
96
with the opinion.
B. Sanford-Brown, Limited and the Seventh Circuit'sRejection of
Implied Certification
United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd. 97 is a case that set the
Seventh Circuit apart from its sister circuits in determining falsity under the
FCA. 98 The case involved suit between a director of education, Brent
Nelson, and Sanford-Brown College, a for-profit institution located in
Wisconsin where he had been employed. 99 Nelson alleged that SanfordBrown received federal subsidies through the Department of Education and
that, based on their recruiting and retention practices, thousands of false
claims were submitted to the government. i00
As a requirement to receive federal education subsidies under Title
[V of the Higher Education Act (HEA), an institution was required to enter
into a program participation agreement with the United States Secretary of
Education.' °" The court found that §1094 details that a participation
agreement would, "include[] certifications of existing facts and forwardlooking promises that the institution [would] abide by certain statutes and

Id.

See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Sews., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 517 (1st
Cir. 2015) (stating First Circuit implemented regulations).
96 See id.
(explaining holding).
97 788 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2015).
98 See id.at 700 (highlighting difference between Seventh Circuit in determining falsity).
99 See id.The director only spent six months in the position before resigning. Id.
100 See id.(explaining Nelson's argument against Sanford-Brown). The suit noted that the
potential liability of the false claims reached into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Id.
101 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1094(a) (West 2008). The statute states in pertinent part:
95

[I]n order to be an eligible institution for the purposes of any program authorized under
this title, an institution must be an institution of higher education or an eligible
institution (as that term is defined for the purpose of that program) and shall, except
with respect to a program under subpart 4 of part A [20 USCS §§ 1700c et seq.], enter
into a program participation agreement with the Secretary.
Id. Section 1094(a) goes on to detail over 29 requirements with which the institution must
comply. See id.
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regulations attendant to Title IV.' 1° 2 Nelson specifically alleged that
Sanford-Brown violated provisions of the participation agreement that:
i) prohibited them from paying incentive compensation to
certain types of employees involved in admissions and
recruiting; ii) required them to maintain accreditation; iii)
required them to refund to the U.S. Department of
Education portions of Title [V funds for certain students

who failed to complete at least 60% of a term; iv)
prohibited them from harassing students to attend class; v)
required students who received Title [V funds to maintain
a minimum GPA or other adequate progress towards
graduation; and vi) prevented them from admitting
students with remedial needs into accelerated programs. 03
In analyzing the potential liability for Sanford-Brown under the
FCA, the Seventh Circuit first turned to the participation agreement signed
by the institution. 104 Notably, the court reasoned that the participation
agreement incorporated by reference, "thousands of pages of other federal
laws and regulations."10 5
In determining actual liability under the FCA, the Seventh Circuit

first discussed three necessary elements: "(1) a false or fraudulent claim;
(2) which was presented for payment, or caused to be presented for
payment, by the defendant; (3) with knowledge the claim was false. 10 6
102

Sanford-Brown, 788 F.3d at 701.

103 Id. at 702.
104

See id. at 706 (describing how court analyzed their decision). The court noted that bold

text on the first page of the fifteen-page document read as follows, "[t]he execution of this
Agreement by the Institution and the Secretary is a prerequisite to the Institution's initial or
continued participation in any Title IV, HEA Program." Id.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 709 (citing U.S. ex rel Fowler v. Caremark RX, L.L.C., 496 F.3d 730, 741 (7th
Cir. 2007)). The Fowler case involved fraud in connection with the distribution of prescription
drugs to members in a federal health insurance plan. Fowler, 496 F.3d at 733. Allegations
included failure to provide refunds, modifying prescriptions without approval, misrepresentation
of potential savings, failure to substitute generic drugs, failure to credit prescriptions lost in the
mail, and manipulation of mandatory prescription filling times. Id. at 734; United States v.
Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 708 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining various arguments). Nelson
additionally made an argument that Sanford-Brown had created a false record when entering into
the agreement itself While the elements are slightly different here, they would have required
Nelson to show that Sanford-Brown had the requisite mens rea intent to defraud the government
when completing the participation agreement itself, rather than when submitting the subsequent
false claims for reimbursement. Id. The elements in such a case would be as follows: "(1) the
defendant made a statement or record in order to receive money from the government; (2) the
statement or record was false; and (3) the defendant knew it was false." Id.; United States ex rel
Yannacopoulos v. General Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting necessary
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Nelson's argument was that Sanford-Brown had agreed to comply with all
provisions of the participation agreement and not doing so would enact
liability under the FCA. 10 7 The case hinged on the determination of
whether compliance with the participation agreement was not only a
condition of participation, but also a condition of payment.'08 Nelson and
the government primarily relied on a Ninth Circuit case which also found
that a similarly worded participation agreement would generate liability
under the FCA.' 0 9 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a condition of
participation and condition of payment were distinctions without a
difference. " 0° Sanford-Brown countered that the participation agreement
was the key document and that, following the Yannacopoulos case, if it was
entered into in good faith it was sufficient to guard against any liability for
subsequent claims under the FCA."' The court ultimately ruled against
Nelson holding that:
Good-faith entry into the PPA is the condition of payment

necessary to be eligible for subsidies under the U.S.
Department of Education's subsidies program.

Absent

evidence of fraud before entry, nonperformance after entry
into an agreement for government subsidies does not
impose liability under the FCA. 112
According to the Seventh Circuit, "[t]he FCA is simply not the
proper mechanism for government to enforce violations of conditions of
participation contained in-or incorporated by reference into-a
[participation agreement.]." 3 The court concluded:

elements). In Yannacopoulos, the relator alleged that he was entitled to significant fees for
arranging for the sale of F-16 Fighter Jets to a foreign nation, Greece. 652 F.3d 818, 822.
107 See Sanford-Brown, 788 F.3d at 708 (describing Nelson's argument).
108 See id. at 710 (highlighting case issues).
109 See id at 710 (comparing circuit court decisions).
110 See United States ex rel Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1116, 1176 (9th Cir.
2006) (explaining reasoning). The Ninth Circuit further held that, "if we held that conditions of
participation were not conditions of payment, there would be no conditions of payment at all
and thus, an educational institution could flout the law at will." Id. The strongly worded opinion
went on to claim that the university's argument was merely "semantic" in nature, and that
compliance with standards in a participation agreement were "prerequisites" for federal funding.
Id. "[I]f
the University had not agreed to comply with them, it would not have gotten paid." Id.
111See Sanford-Brown, 788 F.3d at 708 (stressing importance of participation agreement).
112 See id. at 710 (joining Eight Circuit's holdings). The court held the FCA's liability was
not triggered by failure to comply with the Title IV restrictions subsequent to entry into the
participation agreement, similar to the Eight Circuit. Id.
113 See id at 712 (citing Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001)). The court went
on to acknowledge the Department of Education's ability to enforce portions of the participation
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In sum, "PPA" is an abbreviation for Program Participation
Agreement-not Program Payment Agreement. When
entered in good faith, a PPA memorializes conditions of
participation (not conditions of payment) in connection
with the U.S. Department of Education's subsidies
program. In this case, the agency's regulations have at all
times provided-and continue to provide-a governmental
enforcement mechanism in the form of an administrative
proceeding before the subsidizing agency, whereby any
evidence of violations of conditions of participation may
be considered and adjudicated. 114
C. Escobarat the Supreme Court
UHS petitioned the Supreme Court on several questions and
Escobar was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on December 4,
2015.1 5 National reaction was that this case could have significant
implications for government contractors, as well as the potential to impact
those receiving government grants." 6 The Court's decision resolved the
agreement through administrative mechanisms, including the ability to terminate an institution
from one of its programs. Id.
114 Id. The court then rejected Nelson's theory that any claims sent to the government
following non-compliance with the participation agreement were false. Id.
115 See Petition a for Writ of Certiorari at *ii, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States
es rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2016) (No. 15-7). The petitioner asked:
1. Whether the First Circuit, by sua sponte identifying and relying upon a regulatory
provision not invoked by respondents at any point in the proceedings below to reverse
the district court's dismissal of respondents' complaint, has so far deviated from the
adversary system's party presentation rule "so as to call for an exercise of this Court's
supervisory power" under this Court's Rule 10(a).
2. Whether the "implied certification" theory of legal falsity under the FCA applied
by the First Circuit below but recently rejected by the Seventh Circuit is viable.
3. If the "implied certification" theory is viable, whether a government contractor's
reimbursement claim can be legally "false" under that theory if the provider failed to
comply with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision that does not state that it is a
condition of payment, as held by the First, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits; or whether
liability for a legally "false" reimbursement claim requires that the statute, regulation,
or contractual provision expressly state that it is a condition of payment, as held by the
Second and Sixth Circuits.
Id. The Court agreed to hear questions two and three of the petition. See Universal Health
Services, Inc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 582, 582 (2015) (holding court's decision to hear case);
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States es rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 582 582 (2015) (granting
certiorari).
116 See Mark B. Sweet, New Supreme Court Case Could Be a False Claims Act Game-

Changer, WIEY

REIN, LLP NEWSLETTERS (Dec. 2015),

http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-
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issue that has been split amongst the circuits with the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits finding that
implied certification is a valid FCA theory, while the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits disagreed. 1 17 The ongoing split led to challenges for entities doing
business with the government including health care providers.""S Escobar
resolved incongruence between the circuits by recognizing implied
certification.i" 9 For example, the Second Circuit found that "implied false
certification is appropriately applied only when the underlying statute or
regulation... expressly states the provider must comply in order to be

paid." 120
new sletters-item-New- Supreme-Curt-Case-Could-Be-a-False -Caims-Act-Game-Changer.html.
Sweet discussed the significant impacts and noted how the "expansion" of the FCA under the
First Circuit's interpretation would be sending the statute into the realm of contract law. Id.
Sweet goes on to state that:
[T]he case, Universal Health Service v. United States ex rel. Escobar, could have
profound effects on how aggressive the government and qui tam relators can be in
stretching breaches of contract into false claims, and conversely how much pressure a
contractor faces when deciding whether to settle or litigate such a case.
Id. He further stated the impact that the case could have on potential litigants in making
calculations as to when to fight the government on charges versus when to settle, noting that:
[H]eightened exposure has changed the calculus for many companies facing a
government investigation or a qui tam suit. What may be worth litigating for single
damages is simply too risky when damages are trebled. As a result, many companies
choose to settle cases where the government or a relator has an aggressive
interpretation of the False Claims Act rather than challenge the theory in court.
Id.
117

See Stu Nibley & David Nadler, Mandatory Disclosure For Government Contractors,

CONTRACTS YEAR IN REviw CONFERENCE COVERING 2015 BRIEFS (Feb. 2016)
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/e860002d-d2f2-420e-97f275flf4791455/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b6032902-b8cc-4806-98947b34bbd39414/Mandatory Disclosure For Government Contractors.pdf
(summarizing
procedural and statutory history of FCA). See also Adam Lurie, et al., The End of the Implied
Certification Theory?: The U.S. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Case that Could
Substantially Limit the False Claims Act, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP CLIENTS &
FRIENDS
MEMO
(Dec.
11,
2015),
http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/9dd8772dledb6485
be555
773a2959c7a.pdf
(explaining grant of certiorari in FCA case).
118 See Lurie et al., supra note 117 at 1 (explaining uncertainty caused by split). There was
also increasing concern among contracting agencies about the risks of treble damages in any FCA
case. Id. Furthermore, penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 per claim increased the litigation risk for
any corporation facing potential FCA litigation. Id. at 1-2. These concerns lead to the conclusion
that Escobar will have a far-reaching impact on any contractor doing business with a government
entity, both state and federal. Id. at 2.
119 See id at 3 (describing importance of attention to implied certification theory).
120 Id. (quoting United States ex rel Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001))
GOVT.

(explaining Second Circuit's interpretation of implied false certification).
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Respondents to the appeal by UHS in Escobar to the Supreme
Court argued that the FCA is a statute with plain meaning and that it is
actually a separate provision of the FCA than the one at issue that prevents

the use of a "false record or statement" in connection with a "false or
fraudulent claim."' 12 1 The respondent's brief went on to criticize the
petitioner's opinion that a claim may only be false if it is "factually false;"
it either mis-describes the good, service, or contains an explicit false
statement. 122 Further, the brief goes on to argue the original Congressional
intent of the FCA was to prohibit all possible tactics by contractors from
23
stealing from the public. 1
As expected by many 2 4 , the Court's decision in Escobar led to a
resolution of the multi-circuit split on the issue of express versus implied
certification. 12'5 The Court agreed with the First Circuit and found that
claims of misrepresentations were not merely limited to those which

concerned express conditions of payment. 126 However, the court created a
121

See Brief for Respondents at 25, Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel Escobar,

136 S. Ct. 582 (2016) (No. 15-7) (outlining Respondent's interpretation of FCA). The brief
details that a "claim" is "an assertion of a legal right to government funds, which carries with it an
implied representation that the claimant is legally entitled to payment." Id. at 23. The brief notes
that:
Eighty-seven octane gasoline is not the same as 91-octane gasoline and may cause
damage to an engine not designed for lower-grade gasoline. Military guards who
cannot shoot straight are inferior to guards with marksmanship training. And
psychiatric services provided by unlicensed and unsupervised staff are unsuitable
compared to services provided by properly licensed and supervised professionals (and
are potentially dangerous to the patient's health).
Id. at 25-26.
122 See id. at 25 (countering petitioner's argument).
123 Id. at 23 (comparing misrepresentations regarding quantity of gasoline and proficiency of
military guards to medical treatment).
124 See Nibley & Nadler,_supra note 117 and accompanying sources cited (discussion
predictions upon Supreme Court's grant of certiorari).
125 See Universal Health Serv. v. United States ex rel Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998 (2016)
(discussing reasoning for granting certiorari). "We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement
among the Courts of Appeals over the validity and scope of the implied false certification theory
of liability." Id. at 1998; see also Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justice Chart Their Own Path
in NarrowingR ecoveryfor Implied Fraud Under the False ClaimsAct, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 16,
2016, 9:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-opinion-analysis-justiceschart-their-own-path-in-narrowing-recovery-for-implied-fraud-under-the-fase-claims-act/
(summarizing Escobar and emphasizing importance of resolution). According to Mann, the case
resolved a "major dispute" under the FCA amongst the lower courts. Id. Further, the implied
certification theory was the "big" question in the case that justified review by the Supreme Court.
Id.
126 See Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 1994 (holding omissions of critical qualifying
information can be misrepresentations). "Section 3729(a)(1)(A), which imposes liability on those
presenting 'false or fraudulent claim[s],' does not limit claims to misrepresentations about
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standard for limiting exposure under the FCA by outlining a materiality
requirement specifying that the misinformation from the
provider must be
27
material to the government's decision to pay the claim. 1
In holding the implied certification theory was a valid form of
action under the FCA, the Court first looked at the statute and its use of the
terms "false or fraudulent" and reasoned that it was Congress's intent for
these terms to have their meaning under the common law and thus included
certain misrepresentations by omission. 128 The focus was then on the
parties' disagreement as to whether submitting a claim without disclosing
violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements constituted
an actionable misrepresentation. 129 The court declined to review whether
all claims for payment implicitly represented that the biller is entitled to
payment;, instead, the court reasoned that the claims in this case were
clearly an example of half-truths. 30 Representations made by Universal
express conditions of payment." Id. "What matters is not the label that the Government attaches
to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant
knows is material to the Government's payment decision." Id. The Court held:
[T]he implied certification theory can be a basis for liability, at least where two
conditions are satisfied: first, the claim does not merely request payment, but also
makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the
defendant's failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.
Id.at 2001.
127 See Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 1994-95.

"A misrepresentation about

compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the
Government's payment decision in order to be actionable under the FCA." Id.at 1994. The court
further specified that even violations of express conditions of payment were subject to the
materiality requirements. Id at 2001.
128 See id.at 1999. The Court pointed out the meanings of these terms were well settled. Id.
The Court also pointed out both the parties and the Government, in their briefs, agreed that
misrepresentations by omission could give rise to liability. Id.
129 See id.at 1999-2000 (describing competing arguments).
The government argued that
every submission of a claim for payment was an implicit representation that the claimant was
legally entitled to payment, and that a lack of disclosures rendered the claim misleading, thus
triggering the fraud claim as laid out in the statute. Id. However, Universal Health argued that
submitting a claim involved no representations at all, and, thus, the claim would be nonactionable absent a special duty to disclose a legal violation (which was absent in government
contracting). Id. at 2000.
130 See id. at 2000 (discussing "half-truth" misrepresentations). The court referenced a
"classic example" of an actionable half-truth in contract law of a seller of land revealing that there
may be two new roads near the piece of property, yet not disclosing that a third planned road
would be bisecting the property for sale. Id.; see also Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672
(N.Y. 1931) (discussing misrepresentation elements in contract cases). The Court also provided
the example of an applicant for an adjunct position at a college making an actionable
misrepresentation by listing retirement on his resume, but failing to disclose that the "retirement"
was due to time spent in prison for a $12 million bank fraud. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (2016). See also Sarvis v. Vermont State Colls, 772 A.2d
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Health, in the form of claims submitted using National Provider
Identification numbers corresponding to job titles, were thus determined to
be misrepresentations to the Massachusetts Medicaid program.' 3 ' The
analysis concluded by specifically spelling out the two necessary

conditions for a satisfactory implied certification basis for liability: (1) the
claim must do more than request payment, but also in some way must make
specific representations about the goods and services provided; and (2) the
failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory,
or
32

contractual requirements makes the representations half-truths. 1

In continuing to the questions of liability for conditions of
payment, the Court seemed to go in the opposite direction by stating that
violations were not automatically FCA violations, but they must also pass a

materiality test.'33 The materiality test is a demanding standard that
"look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the
alleged misrepresentation."' 13 4 The Court advocated for a holistic view of
materiality, relying on a number of factors.' 35
This emphasis on materiality as a requirement of claims under the
FCA has the potential to generate significant controversy and challenges

494, 496-99 (Vt. 2001) (holding misrepresentation during hiring process constitutes misconduct
sufficient to support just cause dismissal).
131 See Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 2000 (explaining misrepresentative nature of
Universal's claims).
132 See id. (detailing requirements implied for Massachusetts Medicaid providers).
133 See id at 2001 (addressing Universal's argument). "Whether a provision is labeled a
condition of payment is relevant to but not dispositive of the materiality inquiry." Id; James F.
Hansen, Escobar Gives Defendants New Means to Combat Implied Certification Claims, 10 J.
HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 7, 8 (2016). This additional materiality requirement that went beyond the
ruling on the implied certification theory was welcomed by those defending FCA claims, and has
even led to speculation that there will be a reduction in FCA implied certification claims overall.
Id. "The FCA defense bar might, at first glance, interpret the Supreme Court's rejection of the
Petitioner's argument to be a substantial defeat ....Despite the Court's rejection of Petitioner's
argument, FCA defendants will benefit more than relators from the new implied certification
test." Id.
134 Universal Health Servs., 136 S.Ct. at 2002 (quoting 26 WWLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
69:12 (4th ed. 2016)) (explaining test requirements). Also considered were the direct language in
the statute and any understanding of materiality that has developed under common law. Id. The
statute states that "[t]he term 'material' means having a natural tendency to influence, or be
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4)
(2011). The court additionally drew a line between fraud under the FCA as opposed to breaches
of contract or other regulatory violations. Universal Health Servs., 136 S.Ct. at 2003.
135 Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
Many things are considered in
determining materiality, including but not limited to the Government's decision to expressly
identify a provision as a condition of payment and evidence that the defendant knows that the
Government consistently refuses to pay the claims based on noncompliance with a requirement.
Id.at 2003. Conversely, the Government paying for such claims in full, despite their knowledge
of a violation, would be strong evidence that the requirements are not material. Id.at 2003 -04.
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for lower courts. 13 6 Despite the assertion by the court that the materiality
standard will be a rigorous one, there are already questions as to whether it
will be so stringent in practice. 117 Because of these questions about the new
materiality standard, concerns are arising that Escobar will have merely
replaced one circuit split problem with another. 38
VI. ANALYSIS AND APPLICABILITY OF ESCOBAR TO
WORTHLESS CARE IN NURSING HOMES
The Court's decision in Escobar will have far reaching effects on

government contractors from military contractors, to health care providers,
to universities. 31'9 For too long, circuits were divided over what actually
constitutes falsity under the Act, leading to a myriad of rules in different
geographic areas and ever shifting enforcement standards over time. 4 0 The
intent of the original drafters of the FCA was clear, and a finding parallel to
that of the Seventh Circuit would not have been in accordance with the
intent of the FCA as its plain words indicate. 141 The increase in government
spending in recent years, exacerbated by the spending on outside
contractors, particularly in the health care field, makes this issue more
important than ever for the continued ability of government agencies to
control funds while also providing quality services to all constituents. 142
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sanford-Brown, finds itself alone
amongst the circuits for one particular reason; the other circuits recognize
136

See John T. Bentivoglio, et al., Escobar and the Implied Certification Theory: Initial

Cases Raise the Bar on Materiality in False Claims Act Litigation, SKADDEN INSIGHTS

(November

7,

2016),

https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Escobar and the ImpliedCertification
_Theory.pdf (noting significant changes in viability of FCA claims). "Escobar changes the focus
of the 'government knowledge defense' from scienter to materiality." Id. "The definition of
materiality remains vague and will likely spawn a new series of circuit splits as the courts
struggle to apply Escobar 's reasoning." Id.
137 See Robert W. Miller, Escobar Appears to Open the Door to More "Materially" False
Claims, 10 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 1, 6, (2016) (suggesting courts may be hesitant to label
certain rules as "minor").
138 See Bentivoglio, supra note 136, at 4 (noting vagueness in defining materiality
continues). The circuit courts have already begun to show splits along the materiality standard.
Id.at 3. Notably, the Seventh Circuit held that the government's mere ability to decline payment
was not enough to survive summary judgment on the materiality element. Id. Whereas,
conversely, the eighth Circuit specified that materiality depended on whether keeping accurate
records influenced the government's decision to enter into a relationship with the defendant. Id.
139 See infra Section V(0) (explaining need to resolve circuit split).
140 See supra Parts 111-0 (discussing requirements of FCA claim).
141 See supra Parts I-II (outlining reason for FCA and its importance).
142 See supra Part III and accompanying text (discussing problems with FCA in healthcare

field).
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the importance of following the intent of the FCA should serve as guidance
for the Supreme Court as it contemplates Escobar.143 Moreover, given the
more complex nature of arrangements between the government and its
contractors, cases that rely on non-traditional forms of enforcement will be
essential, such as participation agreements and provider contracts. 144 As
the government partners more and more with contractors, the language of
agreements will continue to shift away from regulations and more towards
the more business-familiar
contracts with its obligations and enrichments
45
1
within.
detailed
The Escobar decision will have a major impact on the nature of
worthless quality of care cases in nursing homes which have to this point
faced numerous challenges in enforcement ability. 46 The Federal Nursing
Home Reform Act governs requirements that skilled nursing facilities
under Medicare and nursing homes under Medicaid must meet in order to
be eligible to provide services through these programs. 147 Following these
regulations can be interpreted as preconditions of payment under the First
Circuit's interpretation of falsity. 148 The Reform Act established certain
requirements that must be met, such as: "(A) In general a nursing facility
must care for its residents in such a manner and in such an environment as
will promote maintenance or enhancement of the quality of life of each
resident.', 149 Violations of these rules15 will establish the required falsity
under the First Circuit's interpretation. 0
Healthcare cases under the FCA, specifically those regarding care
provided in nursing homes, will continue to see a rising importance in
coming years. 151 The Federal FCA has proved to be an important tool in
cost control overall as well as in healthcare programs. 152 This tool,
however, has not proven to be completely effective in its administration
and recent decisions have put into question the ability of the Federal
Government to recoup misspent funds through the FCA. 15 Contemporary
cases interpreting the FCA have led to the development of case law that has
143
144
145
146
147

See
See
See
See
See

supra Sections V(A)-(0) (describing differences between circuit rules).
supra Sections V(A)-(0).
supra Part I (providing history of FCA).
supra Part II (noting difficulty establishing worthless services claims).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3 (West 2014); See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.13-70 (providing

guidelines for care).
148 See supra PartI.
149 See supra PartI.
150 See supra Sections V(A) and V(0) (explaining falsity requirement).
151 See supra notes 13-19 (outlining causes for future increase in importance).
152 See supra Part I (discussing origins of FCA).
153 See United States ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699,
710 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining difficulties in proving false claims).
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54
complicated the analysis of whether an action is false under the Act. 1
These judicially generated requirements for the Act have unnecessarily
complicated the analysis of the FCA that was intended
to merely recoup
55
funds spent on services which had diminished value. 1

Some jurisdiction's use of preconditions of payment and
preconditions of participation have created murky waters where
government officials and judicial officials are required to create distinctions
in the law where it did not originally exist. 156 Additionally, the very nature
of nursing home cases and the requirement of worthless services under the
FCA, creates challenges in the long-term care related cases. 157 Worthless
services can only be found where there's no value to the services at all. 15
This creates an issue due to the very nature of long-term care services
wherein some services are being provided by the very fact that a consumer
is residing in a facility, yet the concern becomes what did the federal
government intend to pay for. 159Alternative theories which have been put
forward for interpretation of the FCA have offered a more reasonable
interpretation in how the Act should be applied and how it falls closer in
line with its original intent, even in long-term care cases.160
This added complexity to the law has made it more difficult to
recoup misspent funds that would appear to clearly fall within the original
intent of the FCA. 161 This differentiation from the application of the Act
154

See United States ex rel Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 379 (1st

Cir. 2011) (describing additional requirements to satisfy falsity). The Blackstone case added
language that the regulation being violated must be expressly written in the law. Id. at 3 87
155 See supra Part I (discussing origins of FCA).
156 See supra Part 0 (outlining distinctions created by requirements).)
157 See supra Part II (explaining worthless services). The FCA places strong restrictions on
what meets the participation requirements of a valid participant in the program. See supra note
35.

158 See case cited supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing interpretations of
"worthless services").
159 See United States ex rel Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc., 764 F.3d 699,
710 (7th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing services that are "worth less" from "worthless services").
160 See Utterback, supra note 41, at 156 and accompanying discussion (suggesting that proof
of worthless service should go to reason payment was made). Utterback offers a reasonable
alternative in that the government would not have paid for a service had it known what was
actually being provided. Id. This falls closer to what was originally intended by the adoption of
the FCA. See supra notes 4-10. It additionally addresses the challenges of the long-term care
setting in that there are services being provided but, essentially, the government would not have
wanted to pay for them had they known what was being done. See supra note 34, at 478.
161 See United States ex rel Loughren v. Unum Grp., 613 F.3d 300, 307 (1st Cir. 2010)
(explaining long-held requirement of materiality); United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th
Cir. 2008) (noting statements or omissions can be material); United States v. Houser, No. 4:10
CR 012 HLM, 2011 WL 2118847, at *10 (N.D. Ga. May 23, 2011) (establishing knowledge
requirement). These cases demonstrated that there were services provided that were not what the
government intended to pay for. Id. However, there were judicially created hurdles which stood
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and the original intent will have practical implications as the need for
effective government funded long-term-care continues to rise over the next
several decades. 162 Recent cases have offered opportunities for
simplification on the interpretation of the FCA and have given the
government more of an ability to control the money they spend
and to
63
ensure that it is spent on services that have appropriate value. 1
This trend has continued with the Escobar case. 164 This has further
broadened the interpretation of the FCA and has allowed the government to
recoup money in cases that previously would have been unavailable. 65
The further aligning of multiple circuits around this interpretation will ease
the administration of FCA cases across states and provide both government
officials and medical providers with expectations as to what the abilities are
of the government to recoup funds. 166 These cases are of particular
importance in long-term care situations where the government had been
placed in the precarious position of arguing that even though someone was
67
a resident at a facility, there was no value to the services they received. 1
VII. CONCLUSION
Further aligning of the circuits has been achieved by the Supreme
Court. As these cases continue to present challenges across several circuits,
it becomes clear that there should be a reconciliation of what it actually
means to have falsity under the FCA. It is clear that significant spending in
this area will lead to more cases in the near and distant future, all of which
will be of importance to all manner of parties interested in government
spending and health care.
in the way of recoupment of the funds. Houser, 2011 WL 2118847, at *10; Rogan, 517 F.3d at
452; Loughren, 613 F.3d at 307.
162 See supra notes 13-19 (noting future increases in long-term care funding).
163 See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir.

2011) (arguing FCA was intended to be broad). The Blackstone and Amgen cases expanded the
government's ability to recoup misspent funds by simplifying the previous interpretation of
conditions of participation and conditions of payment. See supra Part IV (explaining prior
interpretations).
164 See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., No. 11-11170-DPW,
2014 WL 1271757, at *5-6 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (noting Escobar'scitation to First Circuit
decisions).
165 See id (explaining other courts had similarly found only conditions of payment mattered
for falsity).
166 See supra Part 0 (showingFirst Circuit's recommitment to broad definition of falsity).
Appeals courts have appropriately recognized a need to return to the statutory intent of the FCA
rather than judicially constructed hoops. See supra Part 0. The Escobar case aligns several of the
circuits together including the First, Second, and Sixth. See supra Part 0(C).
167 See supra Part III (outlining certification approaches).
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Originally, the FCA was implemented to protect the government
from unscrupulous vendors providing inferior goods for a profit.
Government spending has continued to rise particularly in the areas of
healthcare. Projections show that this increase will continue in coming
years and will result in more opportunities for providers to profit off of
inferior services. The Supreme Court now has an opportunity in Escobar
to follow the First Circuit's lead and establish strong powers for the
government to ensure that quality products are provided when the
government is the payor. developing a national standard that follows the
path of the First Circuit will place the nation in concert with the original
intent of the FCA. Importantly, it will also grant governmental agencies a
powerful tool to recoup wasted money in a time when government
spending is under an ever increasingly intense microscope. Expanding the
concept of falsity to include conditions of participation and conditions of
payment will allow the FCA to continue to function throughout the twentyfirst century as it had been intended from its origin.
It is demonstrably clear that as the government continues to
contract out services that were previously managed internally, that the FCA
will be a more important tool in managing taxpayer dollars. Congress
recognized the importance of strong provisions to prevent fraud of the
government when it first established the FCA following the Civil War.
They notably included plain language that was to be construed broadly, so
that the government could always get what it was paying for. One has to
question the idea, held by the Seventh Circuit justices, that Congress
intended contractors to comply with some requirements of the government,
but not others. Whether they be promulgated through statutes or individual
agreements. The First Circuit has implicitly recognized the intent of the
creators of the law and interprets their words as they should be interpreted,
at their face value. The over complication that has taken place in recent
decades regarding legal and actual falsity or implied and express
certification or conditions of participation versus conditions of payment
has.
The Supreme Court has appropriately held to the original intent
and language of the statute. With a finding that mirrors the First Circuit's,
requiring a holistic view of falsity rather than a definition marred on
political constructs, the federal government, and states as well, will again
be able to get the services they are actually paying for. The importance of
this in a society where more and more elderly are entering nursing homes,
at the government's expense, cannot be overstated. It not only relates to
government spending, but importantly has implications for health and end
of life dignity as well. A correct decision by the court will give regulators
a tool to keep government contractors in line with their promises.
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